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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This study aims to analyze the objectives of LBO 
transactions, together with the risks and 
opportunities that can derive to the whole firms’ 
stakeholders. From this perspective, we add to 
previous literature that has investigated the 
post-LBO operating performance and the factors that 
can determine the success of those deals. In 
particular, we confirm the hypothesis of a potential 
peril of assets stripping, even if we find evidence 
that the presence of private equity, among other 
factors, can help to mitigate that issue. We find 
evidence that especially firms characterized by a 
higher debt before the deal, are more suitable to 
experiment a contraction of the number of 
employees, even if also for this variable we find 
evidence that the presence of private equity 
mitigates that threat. We find evidence of a 
contraction of the cost of employees, which seems 
to become even stronger when the firm is 
characterized by a higher level of taxation and when 
a private equity investor is involved. We find 
evidence that, especially in the short term, 
enterprises suffer from a slight deterioration in 
operating performance compared to their situation 
before the buyout. Moreover, under specific 
circumstances, enterprises experience a slight 
improvement in the ability to generate cash. Finally, 
we find evidence that the presence of private equity 
investors is mainly able to promote the growth of 
firms, as well as to increase the capability to 
generate cash. To perform this analysis, we created a 
dataset that was sufficiently large and able to carry 
out a survey of these types of operations, with a 
final sample consisting of 2,450 MBO and MBI deals, 
which we consider as particularly significant since it 
is related to a very broad sample of transactions 
occurred around the world. Thank this dataset, we 
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add to previous literature that has investigated the 
post-LBO operating performance and the factors that 
determine their success, as well as their failure. 
More in particular, we show how the presence of a 
private equity operator seems to be beneficial, 
especially for promoting the growth of firms in the 
medium and long term, as well as to increase the 
capability to generate cash, together with the 
hypothesis to generate positive effects on the level 
of employment. Nevertheless, we find evidence that 
in certain case the presence of PE investors can 
become potential detrimental for firms, probably 
because their pressure to achieve their financial 
performance push them to bear a high level of risk, 
with the consequence of a higher likelihood of 
distress. The remainder of the paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 is dedicated to a brief overview of 
the literature on LBO transactions. Section 3 
summarizes our research hypothesis, about the risks 
and opportunities of LBOs transactions. Section 4 
describes the dataset and the model of analysis, 
together with the variables observed. Section 5 
presents the evidence obtained. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
During different times, LBO transactions have 
received considerable attention in the economic 
literature (Nikoskelainen & Wright, 2005). From this 
perspective, there is an abundance of research on 
the increase in the value of the targets of buyouts 
and returns made by the buyout level of investment. 
However, since the availability of the output of this 
research depends on access to information on 
transactions, which are usually confidential, 
research on the returns of buyout is focused on 
limited samples (Kaplan, 1989) or level analysis 
investment funds (Kaplan & Scholar, 2003; 
Ljungqvist & Richardson, 2003). Studies that analyze 
the factors that have an impact on the returns of 
buyouts can be ascribed to the existing literature on 
LBOs. In particular, a large literature on the 
economic effects of the buyout, focused mainly in 
the US in the 80s and 90s, has generally 
demonstrated a positive impact of this transactions 
on corporate organization, as measured by an 
increase in the profitability and productivity of the 
subsidiary (Kaplan, 1989; Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990; 
Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990; Palepu, 1990; Smith, 
1990; Wright, Thompson, & Robbie, 1992). In the 
literature, over the years, have been put forward and 
tested several hypotheses about the LBO. The idea of 
tax incentives (tax benefits hypothesis) consider the 
advantage resulting from increased deductibility of 
interest expense that is achieved with the 
implementation of the LBO because it is financed by 
the increase in financial leverage (Lowenstein, 1985; 
Kaplan, 1989a; Frankfurter & Gunay, 1992; Halpern, 
Kieschnick, & Rotenberg, 1999). 
Jensen (1986) suggests that the companies 
engaged in a buyout transaction increase their 
operating profitability more than comparable firms 
that are not subject to such action, as a result of 
better governance mechanisms. Cressy, Munari, and 
Malipiero (2007) show that in the first three years 
after the buyout operating profits of venture-backed 
firms is higher by 4.5% compared to their 
comparables, in agreement with Jensen’s hypothesis. 
In addition, the initial yield of venture-backed firms 
plays a key role in the post-buyout profitability, 
suggesting that the ability in the selection of 
investments and financial engineering techniques 
may be more important in the managerial incentives 
to generate higher performance for these companies. 
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
the change in the governance structure of these 
firms leads to the creation of a new organizational 
structure, which is more efficient than the previous 
one. There is also the possibility of underestimation, 
which emphasizes the existence of a positive 
relationship between the underestimation of pre-
LBO firms and the gains expected by the 
shareholders at the time of completion of the 
transaction. Within the work carried out by 
Renneboog, Simons, and Wright (2007), this effect is 
found to be stronger for the Management Buyout 
(MBO) and Institutional Buyout (IBO), rather than in 
Management Buy-In (MBI), as the former are able to 
make better use of the problems related to the 
underestimation and deriving from information 
asymmetries. The hypothesis of defense against 
takeover, however, suggests that LBOs transactions, 
especially if then followed by a delisting, are the last 
line of defense against hostile takeovers and initial 
public offerings (Lowenstein, 1985; Stulz, 1988), 
especially when the pressure on the part of the 
market for corporate control becomes stronger 
(Lehn & Poulsen, 1989; Halpern, Kieschnick, & 
Rotenberg, 1999). According to the free cash flow 
hypothesis proposed by Jensen in 1986, the LBOs 
lead to corporate governance mechanisms that 
reduce agency costs and by improving operational 
efficiency lead to an increase in the value of the 
firm. The central elements of this governance 
structure are the debt and the presence of active 
investors. Agency costs arise if the cash flow is 
invested in less profitable development, expanding 
the business or distributed to shareholders. Debt 
can reduce these costs and can be used as a 
substitute for dividends, creating an obligation to 
pay periodic interests. However, the inability to 
repay these costs and capital borrowed can lead to 
the liquidation of the company. Since the LBO debt 
levels are very high, most of the cash flow is used to 
honor the debt service. The threat of bankruptcy 
created by the failure to pay interest motivates 
companies to become as efficient as possible. The 
massive use of debt to finance the buyout leads to a 
reduction in shareholders’ equity in the financial 
structure, allowing investors and private equity 
managers to control the majority of shares, which 
would otherwise not be able to buy. The 
concentrated ownership provides private equity 
investors the ability to monitor and control the 
strategy of the Target Company through an active 
presence on the board. Support for Jensen’s theory 
of free cash flow has been documented in numerous 
studies. Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Kaplan (1989), 
Smith (1990), Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990), 
Cotter and Peck (2001) and Bruton, Keels, and 
Scifres (2002) find that higher leverage and 
realignment of incentives have a positive effect on 
the operating performance of the company being 
leveraged buyout. Furthermore, Bull (1989), Hall 
(1990), Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990), Opler (1992), 
Long and Ravenscraft (1993), Ofek (1994), Wright, 
Hoskisson, Busenitz, and Dial (2001), Desbrières and 
Schatt (2002) and Harris, Siegel, & Wright (2005) 
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provide evidence of a cost-cutting, improved 
margins and efficiency after the buyout. Easterwood, 
Seth, and Singer (1989), Singh (1990), Smith (1990), 
Long and Ravenscraft (1993) and Holthausen and 
Larcker (1996) also show that, even if the buyout 
lead to improvements in performance and financial 
accounting, such improvements are not durable, so 
that seem to be reduced with increasing time since 
the buyout. Operational performance, as well as the 
efficient use of available resources and funding, are 
key elements of the value of the firm. However, the 
various changes and improvements in operational 
only serve as a proxy but are not direct measures of 
the value created. In addition, the changes made to 
operations often are in the short term and can have 
a negative effect on the future prospects of a 
company. As pointed out by Jensen (1989), the 
private equity firm, as well as any other party that 
provides equity, wants to maximize the value of 
their investment: therefore, the returns generated by 
buyouts are of fundamental importance to their 
income and reputation. Performance can only be 
measured when the investment was made through 
an exit through IPO, trade sale or other similar 
forms of disposal. The increase or decrease in value, 
and any conclusions about the factors leading to this 
change must be based on measures arising from the 
comparison of the difference in value that occurs 
between the date of entry and the time of exit. This 
makes it possible to measure both the success of the 
buyout that the importance of factors that influence 
the degree of success. As Kaplan (1991) and Wright, 
Thompson, Robbie, and Wong (1995) show that 
there is strong evidence on the longevity of the 
buyout, Holthausen and Larcker (1996) point out 
that the evidence relating to the performance of 
buyouts are limited only to those whose exit has 
been through IPO. Wright et al. (1995) show that the 
size of a buyout is positively correlated to a short 
period of detention and to a high probability of exit. 
Kaplan (1991) found similar evidence, even if the 
results are not conclusive since his study focuses 
only on larger acquisitions. This suggests that the 
size of the buyout could be very influential in 
determining performance. When private equity 
funds invest in a number of buyouts, each of these 
investments will contribute to the overall 
performance of the fund. Because their financial 
sponsors want to make major investments, it could 
be expected a high total return, which will boost the 
overall performance of the private equity fund. 
Then, it must be considered that private equity 
investors often want to invest in companies that are 
able to provide a high income, rather than use their 
energies on small businesses that require significant 
efforts, but only marginally impact of the overall 
yield of their funds, even if the yield percentage of 
each individual investment is high. In addition, for 
financial investors, it can be more difficult to get 
investment in small businesses, either due to lack of 
interest by large industrial customers because it 
does not have a sufficient size in order to be listed 
on a regulated market. 
 
3. HYPOTHESIS: RISKS AND PERILS IN LBO 
TRANSACTIONS 
 
During recent years, there has been a particularly 
intense debate among several authors, in order to 
investigate about the objectives of LBO transactions, 
together with the risks and opportunities that can 
derive to the whole firms’ stakeholders. With regard 
to the economic effects of buyout transactions, the 
economic literature shows that such interventions, 
generally determine a major improvements in 
shareholder wealth (De Angelo, De Angelo, & Rice, 
1984; Kaplan, 1989b; Lehn & Poulsen, 1989; 
Easterwood, Singer, Seth, & Lang, 1994, Weir & Laing, 
2003; Renneboog & Simons, 2005; Renneboog et al., 
2007). Very often, however, these gains to 
shareholders, are related to the expropriation of 
minority investors (Amihud, 1989) and other 
stakeholders (Marais, Schipper, & Smith, 1989), such 
as the bondholders (Travlos & Cornett, 1993; Citron, 
Wright, Ball, & Rippington, 2003) and employees 
(Shleifer & Summers, 1988; Wright, Bacon, & Amess, 
2009). The changes produced in the company’s 
performance after the completion of these 
transactions have been an object of interest by a 
growing literature (Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990; 
Cressy et al., 2007; Cao & Lerner, 2009; Guo, 
Hotchkiss, & Song, 2009; Jelic & Wright, 2010). From 
this point of view, the results achieved from the 
literature, however, are discordant. In particular, 
with reference also to the operations of delisting 
that took place from 1980 to 1989, US literature on 
LBOs identifies improvement in the performance of 
the company after the completion of a buyout 
(Kaplan, 1989; Singh, 1990; Long & Ravenscraft, 
1993; Smart & Waldfogel, 1994). On the other hand, 
the most recent literature, focusing on delisting 
made during the period 1998-2004 in the US and the 
UK, provides evidence more heterogeneous. In their 
study on the second wave of LBOs in the US, Guo, 
Hotchkiss, and Song (2011) find no evidence on the 
presence of a significant improvement in adjusted-
performance after LBOs. Analyzing the market of 
delisting in the UK, Weir, Jones, and Wright (2009) 
find that the performance has deteriorated 
compared to pre-buyout, but private companies have 
performed worse than those that have been listed, 
and indeed, there is some evidence showing that the 
performance of delisted may be slightly better. The 
analysis of the adjusted-performance of European 
companies delisted shows an improvement in the 
situation of these companies before delisting. It was 
also demonstrated that the presence of a private 
equity operator is able to positively influence the 
long-term performance, especially when the target is 
large and has a company needs to initiate a complex 
process of restructuring. From this perspective, 
some authors evidence that a strategy of delisting, 
for a company that has a complex restructuring 
plan, it is a good way to implement the turnaround 
strategy more effectively and away from the public 
eye: this is especially important for small listed 
companies, that cannot afford to undertake such a 
journey without the support of the market (Capizzi, 
Caselli, Giovannini, & Pesic, 2012). Long and 
Ravencraft (1993) found that performance tends to 
be as high as smaller performances are pre-delisting, 
even if they do not find any evidence of this effect in 
the medium or long term. Guo et al. (2009) for the 
US and Weir, Jones, and Wright (2009) for the UK, 
argue that when a private equity firm is involved in 
an operation of PTPs, there is a deterioration of 
corporate performance compared to pre-buyout, but 
there is no evidence that these enterprises have 
worse performance than their counterparts listed. 
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4. DATASET AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
4.1. Data 
 
Coherently with the objective of analyzing the 
relation existing between the buyout and the impact 
of these interventions on operating performance, 
debt, taxes, employment, dimension of the 
companies, a significant effort to provide a dataset 
that was sufficiently large, so that it was able to 
carry out a survey of these types of operations. To 
achieve these results, it was decided to focus 
attention on the overall deals relating to MBO and 
MBI transactions carried out worldwide, in order to 
obtain a database that could be represented in terms 
of dimension and significance of the phenomenon. 
We initially considered a sample obtained from 
Zephyr Database (Bureau Van Dijk Electronic 
Publishing), which consists of 12,098 deals that took 
place during the period 1997-2015. Data on 
economic and financial performance achieved by the 
enterprises before and after the transaction are 
obtained from the database, Orbis Database (Bureau 
Van Dijk Electronic Publishing), which allows us to 
obtain data on 6,780 companies which have been a 
target of LBO transactions during the period from 
2002 to 2015 (we consider Zephyr and Orbis 
Database since they have been largely considered in 
economic literature, especially when dealing with 
other country than US, given their coverage in terms 
of deals and financial performance). Unfortunately, 
the data on economic and financial performance 
were not available for all the firms we considered. 
There are several explanations for this, including 
situations in which the companies have merged with 
other companies or where they changed the name 
making it impossible to find them. Through the 
combination of information from the two databases, 
it was possible to have a final sample of 2,450 deals, 
occurred during the period 2002-2012, for which we 
have been able to catch information on the economic 
and financial performance of the target company 
among a window of 5 years before and after the 
deal. 
 
4.2. Empirical model 
 
To examine the effects of LBO transactions on firms’ 
performance among the window of 5 years before 
and after the deal, we estimate the following model, 
for which we use 3 alternative versions with 
increasing complexity: 
 
       (        )    (                       )     (                  )    (   )
   (                     )    (                 )    (     )
   (                 )     (          )     (          )
    (                     )     (                )     (                       )
    (                      ) 
(1) 
 
The first version of the model uses the 
minimum number of independent variables, trying 
to investigate the impact on the various dependent 
variables thinking primarily in terms of performance 
generated, efficiency, debt, and taxes. The 
independent variables, measured from 1 to 2 years 
before the deal, considered in the baseline model are 
the following: the size of the firm (Log Turnover), 
the level of debt (Liability/Total Assets), the level of 
investments (CAPEX/Total Assets), the performance 
(ROA), the indicator of tax burden (Taxation/Total 
Assets) and finally the reverse of capitalization (Total 
Debt/Equity). The other two versions of the model 
can be considered as extensions of the basic model, 
which aim to investigate the impact on the various 
dependent variables using a larger number of 
independent variables. In particular, the second 
version of the model takes into account the type of 
operation carried out, considering the characteristics 
of the financial and legal system. The other 
independent variables used in this case are: the 
PE&VC dummy variable, the Management Buyout 
dummy variable, the Common Law dummy variable, 
the Bank-Based dummy variable. The third version of 
the model analyzes the impact on the dependent 
variables as independent variables by adding some 
factors that belong to the macroeconomic 
environment, such as the Index of protection of the 
rights of creditors and debtors, the Index of depth 
of information on credit, the coverage of private 
credit bureau (% adults) and the coverage of public 
credit bureau (% of adults). 
The goal of our analysis is to determine 
whether, after the completion of the transactions, 
the economic and financial performance of 
companies has improved or worsened. To make the 
comparison between the performance pre and post-
operation, we proceed first with the calculation of 
some performance indicators, which are found both 
in the pre-deal and in the post-deal period. More 
specifically, for each variable of the analysis, it was 
decided to check for the changes occurred according 
to the following approaches: 
a) for the short term, we calculated the 
difference between the value of each financial 
indicator between 1 year after the deal and 1 year 
before the deal; 
b) for the short-medium term, we calculated 
the difference between the value of the averages, for 
each indicator, covering the first two years post-deal 
(AV+2) and the two years pre-deal (AV-2); 
c) for the medium-long term, we calculated the 
difference between the value of the averages, for 
each indicator, covering the first three years post-
deal (AV+3) and the three years pre-deal (AV-3); 
d) for the long-term term, we calculated the 
difference between the value of the averages, for 
each indicator, covering the first five years post-deal 
(AV+5) and the five years pre-deal (AV-5). 
Despite we performed our analysis over a 
broader sample of variables, we consider of 
particular interests, the following dependent 
variables, which we investigate through all 3 models 
we discussed previously: 
 Total Assets variation: this indicator aims to 
verify whether, after the completion of the 
transactions, there is a phase of disposal of assets 
not considered to be of strategic importance and 
therefore not part of the core business (Asset 
stripping hypothesis); 
 Numbers of Employees variation: this 
indicator is intended to analyze whether, after the 
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phase of rationalization after the implementation of 
the deal, the companies that were the subject have 
increased or decreased the number of employees 
(Occupation hypothesis); 
 Cost of Employees variation: this indicator is 
intended to analyze whether, after the phase of 
rationalization after the implementation of the deal, 
the companies have increased or decreased the cost 
of employees, as defined by the ratio of cost of 
employees to turnover (Occupation hypothesis); 
 Cash Flow variation: this indicator aims to 
verify whether, after the implementation of the 
transactions, enterprises engage in the more 
efficient management of cash flows (Cash flow 
hypothesis); 
 Turnover variation: this indicator aims to 
investigate whether, after the deal, enterprises 
improve their efficiency, especially in terms of 
managerial efficiency, cost efficiency and 
productivity of the workforce (Operating 
performance hypothesis); 
 Distressed: this indicator represents a 
dummy variable, which assumes value 1 if the 
company after the deal experiments a conjunct 
reduction of total assets, number of employees and 
turnover, and 0 otherwise (Distressed hypothesis). 
 
4.3. Description of the variables 
 
This subsection describes the variables used to 
measure the impact of LBOs on operating 
performance, debt, taxes, employment and the level 
of efficiency, growth in size and financial health of 
the companies that have been subjected. Of course, 
depending on the objective of the analysis, some 
financial variables were considered as dependent 
and independent variables. The financial variables 
used in this study were selected to reflect the 
traditional dimensions of performance evaluation 
within the limits of data availability. In an attempt to 
provide a complete profile of the performance 
achieved by the companies, we considered the 
following financial variables: 
 ROA: this indicator is calculated as the 
operating profit (EBIT) compared to the total assets 
and is an indicator of how the profitability of the 
company is derived from its assets. This indicator 
gives us an idea of how efficient is the management 
to use the business assets to generate profits. The 
higher the ROA is higher, the better because the 
company is generating profits with less investment. 
 Total Debt/Total Assets: is an indicator of 
financial leverage, as well as the percentage of total 
assets that are financed with debt. A report Total 
Debt/Total Assets high indicates that the company 
has a high level of leverage. 
 Debt/Equity: is an indicator of financial 
leverage that is often used in place of the ratio Total 
debt/Total assets. This indicator uses the same 
input but offers a different view. Generally, the 
higher is this ratio the more the greater the risk 
borne by creditors, actual and potential. This 
indicator allows us then to identify how you 
financed the buyout in terms of debt and equity. 
 Financial Expenses/Debt: is an indicator that 
stresses the impact of financial charges on total 
debt. The more the ratio is high and the greater the 
weight of financial charges on debt. Then allows us 
to understand how much of the cost of the debt 
stems from the borrowing costs paid. 
 Taxes/Turnover: this indicator measures the 
impact of taxes, the latter by dividing the value of 
total sales of the company. The higher the ratio 
assumes a high value is the tax burden is high. This 
will result in consequent erosion of revenues from 
sales. 
 Financial Expenses/Turnover large sums for 
the financial burdens which, consequently, will lead 
to the erosion of revenues from sales. 
 CAPEX/Total Assets: The ratio reflects the 
efficiency of a company to employ its operational 
funds to maintain or increase its assets in the 
future. Specifically, it is a measure of the investment 
that the company makes for its future, in order to 
increase the revenue generated from sales. 
In addition to the financial variables, the model 
also employs other variables through which it is 
possible to investigate which factors have had a 
particular impact on the financial performance post-
MBO. This section provides an overview of what has 
been defined as “other variables”: 
 PE&VC: it is a binary dummy variable that 
has a value of one if a private equity provider is 
involved in the transaction, and zero otherwise. The 
expected coefficient is positive because of the 
additional expertise that the operator of PE provides 
to the business (Cressy et al., 2007). It is also 
expected that, given their financial involvement in 
the company, they will undertake effective 
monitoring (Cotter & Peck, 2001; Nikoskelainen & 
Wright, 2007). Analyzing this binary variable shows 
that the PE&VC backed deal is 1746. 
 Listed, Unlisted, Delisted: are binary dummy 
variables that take values respectively equal to one if 
the company is listed (listed), not listed (unlisted) or 
has been expelled from the market (delisted), and 
zero otherwise. Further analysis of these three 
binary variables, it appears that within the sample 
are 52 listed companies, unlisted companies 4864 
and those subject to delisting 280. 
 Country Dummy: are binary dummy 
variables that are named after the country code of 
belonging to the target company. Each variable 
assumes the value of one if the deal is for a target 
company operating in the specific country identified 
by the variable, and zero otherwise. The three main 
countries in which they were made the largest 
number of deals in our final sample are the UK 
operations with 2616, followed by France with 511 
and the U.S., with 509 operations. 
 Deal Type: is binary dummy variables that 
take the name of the category of "Deal Type" belongs 
to the operation. Each variable assumes the value of 
one if the deal falls under the classification of “Deal 
Type” that it represents, and zero otherwise. 
 Secondary Buyout: dummy variables are 
binary ranging to investigate whether or not a 
company has been the subject of a number of 
buyouts greater than one. Respectively, the first 
variable assumes value equal to one if the company 
has been the subject of a second buyout and zero 
otherwise, the second variable will assume a value of 
one if the company has been subject to the third 
buyout and zero otherwise, and finally, the third 
variable assumes value one if the company has been 
the subject of buyout quarter and zero otherwise. 
Overall, the final sample there are 95 operations 
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secondary buyout, 4 tertiary buyouts and only one 
of quarterly. 
 Sector: binary dummy variables are going to 
investigate the area of operation of the target. Each 
variable assumes the value of one if the target 
company we are considering work in the particular 
industry considered by the variable and zero 
otherwise. 
 Creditor Rights Index: with this variable, we 
measure the degree to which the law (concerning 
bankruptcy, collateral, etc.). Protects the rights of 
creditors and debtors thus facilitating the granting 
of credit. The index takes values from 0 to 10, with 
higher scores identifying legislative systems that 
better protect the rights and then seek to expand 
access to credit. 
 Credit Risk Info: with this variable, we 
measure accessibility, scope, and quality of credit 
information available from public and private credit 
registries. The index takes values from 0 to 6, with 
higher scores that determine the availability of more 
and more detailed information on credit, both from 
public records that private offices, in order to 
facilitate the decision regarding the granting of 
loans. 
 Coverage of Private Credit Bureaus (% of 
adults): is a variable that indicates the number of 
individuals and companies registered by a private 
credit bureau with current information on the debt 
has not been repaid, the outstanding loans and loans 
received in the past. The number is expressed as a 
percentage of the adult population. 
 Coverage of Public Records On Credit (% of 
adults): is a variable that indicates the number of 
individuals and companies registered in a public 
register on the credit-date information on the debt 
has not been repaid, the outstanding loans and loans 
received in the past. The number is expressed as a 
percentage of the adult population. 
 Common Law: in this context, common law 
is used as a binary dummy variable that assumes the 
value of one if the country under consideration 
exists a legal system of common law, zero otherwise.  
 Bank-Based: This term identifies the 
countries that have a financial system where banks 
hold a major role in stimulating economic growth, 
because providing more efficient services especially 
regarding the mobilization of savings and the 
reduction of agency problems. In this context, the 
based bank is used as a binary dummy variable that 
assumes the value of one if the country presents a 
value of the ratio of the bank system’s total assets to 
GDP which is above the mean of the sample, and 
zero otherwise. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
5.1. Asset stripping hypothesis 
 
Broadly discussing about the growth of the firms, 
the literature on LBOs and especially the studies 
carried out by Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Singh 
(1990), Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), Kaplan 
(1991), Easterwood and Seth (1993), Asquith, Jones, 
and Kieschnick (1998) tend to highlight that there is 
no significant evidence of the fact that the targets of 
LBO transactions are able to outperform the 
industry average in terms of growth. Our results of 
the analysis are presented in Table 1. 
This analysis aims to identify what are the 
factors that influence the growth of firms, which in 
this case is represented by the dependent variable, 
Variation of Total Assets (Logarithm). The analysis 
seems to confirm the asset stripping hypothesis, 
because of reduction of Total Assets achieved by the 
enterprises (negative and significant coefficient for 
the constant it all the regression). Despite this 
evidence, the analysis shows that firm size is 
positively influenced by the size of the original 
(starting) of the same, from capital expenditures and 
profitability, while it is negatively influenced by debt 
and taxes. Looking at the Total Assets, it could be 
seen that in all three models, the evidence highlights 
that the largest companies at the time “t” experience 
then, in all time horizons thereafter, a further 
increase in their size and therefore a greater growth: 
this is proved by the fact that the coefficients are 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
As regards the relationship CAPEX/TA, the empirical 
evidence tends to emphasize how companies that 
had the higher capital expenditures have then 
subsequently experienced a significant increase in 
their size: also this evidence, as the previous one, is 
particularly significant since intercepts are positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level in all 
three models and is for all time horizons. There is 
also evidence of the fact that the companies that had 
the highest ROA have then experienced a marked 
increase in their size: in this case, the result is 
shown as particularly significant, with the 
coefficients positive and statistically significant at 
the level of 1% in all models and for all time 
horizons. It is also interesting to highlight the 
particularly important role played by the operators 
of PE&VC in this process: in fact, there is a positive 
relationship between the presence of these 
operators and the growth of firms, as the venture-
backed companies are those in the medium and long 
term seem to grow more. The ratio of Liability/TA, 
for all models and all-time horizons, points out that 
companies were more indebted they then 
experienced slower growth than the other, since 
their coefficients are negative and statistically 
significant. Of course, this is also reflected in the 
relationship Taxation/TA, which is also showing the 
coefficients negative and statistically significant at 
the 1% level of significance in all models and time 
horizons of reference, points out that companies 
that have experienced a high tax burden are also 
improved from less. Regarding the independent 
variable “Management buyout”, in accordance with 
the claims made by Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Singh 
(1990), Bhagat et al. (1990), Kaplan (1991), 
Easterwood and Seth (1993), Asquith et al. (1998), it 
presents the coefficients not statistically significant 
and therefore there is no significant evidence of the 
fact that the object of LBO firms are able to 
outperform the industry average in terms of 
expansion. 
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Table 1. Total assets variation 
 
 
Baseline model 
Baseline    +     Transaction 
     model             characteristics 
Baseline    +     Transaction    +    Country 
model               characteristics      effects 
Short term 
(-1, +1) 
Medium 
short term 
(-2, +2) 
Medium 
long term 
(-3, +3) 
Long term 
(-5, +5) 
Short term 
(-1, +1) 
Medium 
short term 
(-2, +2) 
Medium 
long term 
(-3, +3) 
Long term 
(-5, +5) 
Short term 
(-1, +1) 
Medium 
short term 
(-2, +2) 
Medium 
long term 
(-3, +3) 
Long term 
(-5, +5) 
Constant 
-1.1331*** 
(-4.8426) 
-1.2865*** 
(-5.2780) 
-1.2356*** 
(-4.7715) 
-1.1073*** 
(-3.8369) 
-0.7732** 
(-2.0040) 
-0.8322** 
(-2.1068) 
-0.9063** 
(-2.1642) 
-0.8912* 
(-1.9582) 
-0.1707** 
(-2.2529) 
-0.1037** 
(-2.1536) 
-0.0791* 
(-1.9104) 
-0.1245* 
(-1.8926) 
Total Assets t 
0.1343*** 
(5.4523) 
0.1556*** 
(6.0680) 
0.1550*** 
(5.6940) 
0.1486*** 
(4.9019) 
0.1379*** 
(5.4006) 
0.1578*** 
(5.9741) 
0.1542*** 
(5.5099) 
0.1435*** 
(4.6335) 
0.1535*** 
(5.6670) 
0.1692*** 
(6.0397) 
0.1643*** 
(5.5329) 
0.1484*** 
(4.5182) 
Liability/TA t 
-0.1350** 
(-2.5206) 
-0.1579** 
(-2.8203) 
-0.1719*** 
(-2.8889) 
-0.1785*** 
(-2.6821) 
-0.1404*** 
(-2.6112) 
-0.1673*** 
(-2.9916) 
-0.1822*** 
(-3.072) 
-0.1894*** 
(-2.8738) 
-0.1349*** 
(-2.4885) 
-0.1620*** 
(-2.8709) 
-0.1802*** 
(-3.0107) 
-0.1892*** 
(-2.8448) 
CAPEX/TA t 
0.3329*** 
(4.0942) 
0.3385*** 
(3.9884) 
0.3308*** 
(3.6676) 
0.3260*** 
(3.2318) 
0.3225*** 
(3.9465) 
0.3155*** 
(3.7175) 
0.3034*** 
(3.3702) 
0.2903*** 
(2.9009) 
0.3234*** 
(3.9470) 
0.3140*** 
(3.6853) 
0.3022*** 
(3.3440) 
0.2875*** 
(2.8618) 
ROA t 
0.0647*** 
(5.8227) 
0.0648*** 
(5.5791) 
0.0584*** 
(4.7322) 
0.0555*** 
(4.0177) 
0.0638*** 
(5.7331) 
0.0634*** 
(5.4775) 
0.0569*** 
(4.6345) 
0.0538*** 
(3.9428) 
0.0624*** 
(5.5890) 
0.0624*** 
(5.3610) 
0.0561*** 
(4.5462) 
0.0535*** 
(3.8972) 
Taxation/TA t 
-0.3530*** 
(-6.0265) 
-0.3534*** 
(-5.7670) 
-0.3198*** 
(-4.9109) 
-0.3046*** 
(-4.1806) 
-0.3484*** 
(-5.9368) 
-0.3462*** 
(-5.6683) 
-0.3121*** 
(-4.8183) 
-0.2963*** 
(-4.1140) 
-0.3410*** 
(-5.7867) 
-0.3404*** 
(-5.5470) 
-0.3076*** 
(-4.7258) 
-0.2943*** 
(-4.0659) 
Total Debt/Equity t 
-0.0011 
(-1.1969) 
-0.0011 
(-1.0806) 
-0.0009 
(-0.8650) 
-0.0026** 
(-2.1853) 
-0.0011 
(-1.1257) 
-0.0009 
(-0.9327) 
-0.0007 
(-0.6829) 
-0.0023** 
(-1.9682) 
-0.0015 
(-1.5490) 
-0.0013 
(-1.2585) 
-0.0010 
(-0.9437) 
-0.0025** 
(-2.0273) 
PE&VC     
0.0701 
(0.8704) 
0.1743** 
(2.0962) 
0.2493*** 
(2.8319) 
0.3674*** 
(3.7675) 
0.0622 
(0.7650) 
0.1686** 
(2.0061) 
0.2440*** 
(2.7412) 
0.3655*** 
(3.7075) 
Management Buyout      
-0.0818 
(-0.5962) 
-0.0805 
(-0.5640) 
-0.0381 
(-0.2518) 
0.0966 
(0.5740) 
-0.1084 
(-0.7785) 
-0.1008 
(-0.6955) 
-0.0608 
(-0.3957) 
0.0830 
(0.4860) 
Common Law     
-0.3353 
(-1.1696) 
-0.4522 
(-1.5863) 
-0.3662 
(-1.2114) 
-0.3804 
(-1.1795) 
-0.2130 
(-0.4192) 
-0.2482 
(-0.4712) 
-0.1936 
(-0.3464) 
-0.1484 
(-0.2397) 
Bank-Based     
-0.3851 
(-1.3627) 
-0.5466* 
(-1.9351) 
-0.4745 
(-1.5842) 
-0.5337* 
(-1.6584) 
-0.3432 
(-0.9046) 
-0.4902 
(-1.2688) 
-0.4833 
(-1.1793) 
-0.5649 
(-1.2604) 
Creditor Rights Index         
0.0184 
(0.2690) 
-0.0098 
(-0.1394) 
-0.0217 
(-0.2891) 
-0.0562 
(-0.6791) 
Credit Risk Info         
-0.2343* 
(-1.8811) 
-0.2135* 
(-1.6538) 
-0.2006 
(-1.4648) 
-0.1881 
(-1.2385) 
Private Credit Register 
(% POP.) 
        
0.0044 
(0.8900) 
0.0038 
(0.7487) 
0.0036 
(0.6590) 
0.0038 
(0.6360) 
Public Credit Register 
(% POP.) 
        
0.0003 
(0.0282) 
0.0019 
(0.1427) 
0.0033 
(0.2405) 
0.0085 
(0.5517) 
N. Obs. 572 567 555 547 572 567 555 547 572 567 555 547 
Adj. R-squared 0.2818 0.2735 0.2433 0.2018 0.2807 0.2799 0.2532 0.2218 0.2801 0.2774 0.2510 0.2198 
Note: The table reports the results obtained with OLS regression for the different periods considered. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Adj.-R2 is 
adjusted R-squared. 
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5.2. Occupation hypothesis 
 
LBO deals are often criticized because it is claimed 
that cause the loss of jobs in the years post-deal. 
From this perspective, the results obtained by the 
economic literature are very conflicting. Opler (1992) 
finds evidence of a slight increase in employment in 
the post-deal, the thesis also supported by Kaplan 
(1989) and Smith (1990), but when it is considered 
the “industry effects” in the employment level falls. 
Muscarella and Vestuypens (1990) show that 
employment increases during the execution of a 
reverse LBO. A large number of studies on MBO and 
MBI UK, for example, Wright et al. (1992), and Wright 
et al. (2007) show that there is an initial reduction 
followed by a subsequent increase in employment in 
the post-operation but without return to pre-LBO. 
The results obtained with regard to the level of 
occupation are presented in Table 2. 
The analysis aims to identify what are the 
factors that influence the level of employment in 
enterprises, which in this case is the dependent 
variable Variation of Number of Employees 
(Logarithm). The evidence shows that the level of 
employment within a firm is positively influenced by 
the profitability, taxes and the presence of a private 
equity firm, and is negatively affected by debt. 
Looking at the relationship Liability/TA, there is 
significant evidence (at the significance level of 1%) 
in all models and time horizons considered, the fact 
that companies were more leveraged and have 
experienced a substantial reduction in the number 
of employees. The same information, even in a 
different form, is provided by the ratio of Total 
Debt/Equity. For this indicator, as well as the 
previous one, the coefficients are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level for all models 
and time horizons, reflecting the fact that firms that 
use consistently capital debt rather than equity, they 
tend to experience a significant reduction in the 
level of employment. This is because companies 
often heavily in debt are in trouble when they have 
to pay the debt and the interest, so they try to 
recover from this difficult situation by reducing the 
workforce. The ROA, however, points out, for all 
models and all-time horizons, that the most 
profitable companies then tend to experience a 
significant increase in the number of employees. 
This usually happens because companies with 
higher profit, are those that have higher margins 
and therefore can afford to hire new employees. The 
result is shown as particularly significant since the 
coefficients are positive and statistically significant 
at the 1% level. With regard to the relationship 
Taxation/TA you may notice that its coefficients are 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, 
but only in the medium and long term. This means 
that companies that at the time “t” had greater tax 
burden have then experienced in the medium/long 
term and an increase in their workforce. This can be 
explained mainly in light of the tax breaks that 
benefit companies that increase their workforce. It is 
also interesting to highlight the particularly 
important role played by the operators of PE&VC. In 
fact, it can be noticed that there is a positive 
relationship between the presence of these 
operators and the number of employees of the 
companies, as the venture-backed companies are 
those in the medium and long term seem to gain 
most of their staff. This result is fully in agreement 
with the claims made by Opler (1992), Kaplan (1989) 
and Smith (1990), Muscarella and Vestuypens (1990). 
Overall, however, the effects of LBOs on employment 
do not show clear, it is also important to consider 
that often the loss of jobs can also be connected to 
the phenomenon of asset stripping. The results 
obtained with regard to the cost of occupation are 
presented in Table 3. 
In this case, is it possible to notice a general 
contraction of cost of employees (negative and 
statistically significant constant for all the models 
considered), with a reduction which seems to be 
amplified by those firms, which were characterized 
by higher level of taxation before the deals, rather 
than for the presence of private equity investors? 
From this perspective, it seems to be confirmed the 
hypothesis about the strategy of firms involved in 
LBO transactions, to research for a more efficient 
cost structure, achieved also by the reduction of 
wages and salaries (Shleifer & Summers, 1988; 
Wright et al., 2009). Differently, for larger and more 
profitable firms the reduction of costs for 
employees seems to be less significant, probably 
because those firms can achieve their objectives 
without a reduction of wages and salaries. 
 
5.3. Cash flow hypothesis 
 
With regard to the ability of “cash generation” by the 
companies, the US literature and especially Lehn and 
Poulsen (1989), Singh (1990), Kieschnick (1998), 
Opler and Titman (1993), Halpern et al. (1999) have 
achieved over the years strongly conflicting evidence 
regarding the ability of LBO to generate returns for 
shareholders, especially in terms of capability of 
cash flow, which, according to Jensen (1986), would 
result from the reduction in agency costs resulting 
from the separation between ownership and control. 
Recently, the role of free cash flow has also been 
studied on the UK market, but with results similar to 
those achieved in the USA (Weir, Laing, & Wright, 
2005b; Guo et al., 2011). The results we obtained are 
presented in Table 4. 
This analysis aims to identify which factors are 
able to influence the generation of an accumulation 
of cash, which in this case is represented by the 
dependent variable Variation of Cash Flow. The 
evidence shows that the production of an 
accumulation of cash is positively influenced by the 
debt and the realization of a management buyout 
and the presence of a private equity firm, and is 
negatively influenced by the profitability of the 
company and taxes. Looking at the relationship 
Liability/TA, you may notice that in all models and 
time horizons of reference, there is significant 
evidence (at the 1% level) that the most indebted 
companies experience a build-up of cash and 
therefore a reduction in their level of efficiency. This 
probably occurs because most state debt requires 
companies the need for more resources in cash or 
readily convertible into cash. Even the presence of 
an operator of VC&PE appears to act in these terms.  
 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 17, Issue 1, Autumn 2019 (Special Issue) 
 
314 
Table 2. Number of employees variation 
 
 
Baseline model 
Baseline    +     Transaction 
      model               characteristics 
Baseline    +     Transaction    +    Country 
model                  characteristics         effects 
Short term 
(-1, +1) 
Medium 
short term 
(-2, +2) 
Medium 
long term 
(-3, +3) 
Long term 
(-5, +5) 
Short term 
(-1, +1) 
Medium 
short term 
(-2, +2) 
Medium 
long term 
(-3, +3) 
Long term 
(-5, +5) 
Short term 
(-1, +1) 
Medium 
short term 
(-2, +2) 
Medium 
long term 
(-3, +3) 
Long term 
(-5, +5) 
Constant 
-0.0478 
(-0.2143) 
-0.1453 
(-0.6333) 
-0.1247 
(-0.5164) 
-0.1437 
(-0.5703) 
-0.4126 
(-1.0983) 
-0.3801 
(-0.9793) 
-0.0862 
(-0.2238) 
-0.0434 
(-0.1079) 
-0.4468 
(-0.8467) 
-0.4993 
(-0.9136) 
-0.2425 
(-0.4543) 
-0.1240 
(-0.2217) 
Total Assets t 
0.0114 
(0.5084) 
0.0236 
(1.0115) 
0.0295 
(1.2077) 
0.0337 
(1.3242) 
0.0048 
(0.2081) 
0.0190 
(0.8050) 
0.0236 
(0.9621) 
0.0248 
(0.9729) 
0.0214 
(0.8250) 
0.0325 
(1.2227) 
0.0322 
(1.1704) 
0.0324 
(1.1418) 
Liability/TA t 
-0.1971*** 
(-3.5039) 
-0.2069*** 
(-3.5438) 
-0.2500*** 
(-4.087352) 
-0.2544*** 
(-3.9282) 
-0.1996*** 
(-3.5293) 
-0.2125*** 
(-3.6371) 
-0.2525*** 
(-4.1762) 
-0.2593*** 
(-4.0758) 
-0.1979*** 
(-3.4305) 
-0.2036*** 
(-3.4160) 
-0.2338*** 
(-3.7932) 
-0.2335*** 
(-3.6120) 
CAPEX/TA t 
0.0165 
(0.2904) 
0.0114 
(0.1935) 
-0.0105 
(-0.1674) 
-0.0097 
(-0.1458) 
0.0107 
(0.1885) 
-0.0008 
(-0.0142) 
-0.0336 
(-0.5424) 
-0.0381 
(-0.5838) 
0.0136 
(0.2367) 
0.0001 
(0.0022) 
-0.0349 
(-0.5629) 
-0.0406 
(-0.6233) 
ROA t 
0.7729*** 
(5.2083) 
0.8822*** 
(5.8374) 
0.1821*** 
(4.7672) 
0.1513*** 
(3.7359) 
0.7508*** 
(4.9408) 
0.8223*** 
(5.3297) 
0.1731*** 
(4.5871) 
0.1407*** 
(3.5405) 
0.7492*** 
(4.6516) 
0.7698*** 
(4.7091) 
0.1639*** 
(4.3141) 
0.1296*** 
(3.2495) 
Taxation/TA t 
0.4477 
(0.6392) 
0.6533 
(0.9131) 
2.1950*** 
(3.1929) 
2.2676*** 
(3.1260) 
0.3351 
(0.4718) 
0.6053 
(0.8372) 
2.0378*** 
(2.9779) 
2.0606*** 
(2.8713) 
0.3289 
(0.4426) 
0.8195 
(1.0820) 
2.3098*** 
(3.3172) 
2.4131*** 
(3.3154) 
Total Debt/Equity t 
-0.0045*** 
(-6.7191) 
-0.0042*** 
(-6.0491) 
-0.0041*** 
(-5.5983) 
-0.0041*** 
(-5.2359) 
-0.0045*** 
(-6.6465) 
-0.0041*** 
(-5.8069) 
-0.0039*** 
(-5.2972) 
-0.0038*** 
(-4.9010) 
-0.0048*** 
(-6.6299) 
-0.0043*** 
(-5.7870) 
-0.0041*** 
(-5.2052) 
-0.0040*** 
(-4.8261) 
PE&VC     
0.0956 
(1.4805) 
0.1412** 
(2.1445) 
0.2357*** 
(3.5029) 
0.2877*** 
(4.0845) 
0.0845 
(1.2923) 
0.1325** 
(1.9866) 
0.2193*** 
(3.2221) 
0.2693*** 
(3.7901) 
Management Buyout      
0.0662 
(0.5802) 
0.0439 
(0.3773) 
0.0544 
(0.4582) 
0.0355 
(0.2871) 
0.0524 
(0.4513) 
0.0423 
(0.3569) 
0.0679 
(0.5645) 
0.0572 
(0.4583) 
Common Law     
0.3351 
(1.1520) 
0.2042 
(0.6773) 
-0.1047 
(-0.3651) 
-0.1342 
(-0.4440) 
0.2290 
(0.3645) 
0.3765 
(0.5779) 
-4.97E-05 
(-7.65E-05) 
0.2638 
(0.3864) 
Bank-Based     
0.3404 
(1.1603) 
0.0832 
(0.2735) 
-0.2808 
(-0.9647) 
-0.3541 
(-1.1540) 
0.2843 
(0.5657) 
0.2491 
(0.4778) 
-0.1868 
(-0.3692) 
-0.0494 
(-0.0929) 
Creditor Rights Index         
0.0551 
(0.9429) 
0.0320 
(0.5282) 
0.0365 
(0.5783) 
0.0044 
(0.0658) 
Credit Risk Info         
-0.1146 
(-1.1892) 
-0.0999 
(-1.0002) 
-0.0931 
(-0.9845) 
-0.1117 
(-1.0234) 
Private Credit Register 
(% POP.) 
        
0.0021 
(0.5648) 
0.0014 
(0.3710) 
0.0020 
(0.4842) 
0.0023 
(0.5316) 
Public Credit Register 
(% POP.) 
        
0.0004 
(0.0405) 
0.0019 
(0.1793) 
0.0102 
(0.9498) 
0.0132 
(1.1689) 
N. Obs. 463 454 445 431 463 454 445 431 463 454 445 431 
Adj. R-squared 0.1923 0.1991 0.1681 0.1396 0.1919 0.2045 0.1916 0.1743 0.1883 0.1950 0.1872 0.1708 
Note: The table reports the results obtained with OLS regression for the different periods considered. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Adj.-R2 is 
adjusted R-squared. 
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Table 3. Cost of employees variation 
 
 
Baseline model 
Baseline    +     Transaction 
model             characteristics 
Baseline    +     Transaction    +    Country 
model              characteristics       effects 
Short term 
(-1, +1) 
Medium 
short term 
(-2, +2) 
Medium 
long term 
(-3, +3) 
Long term 
(-5, +5) 
Short term 
(-1, +1) 
Medium 
short term 
(-2, +2) 
Medium 
long term 
(-3, +3) 
Long term 
(-5, +5) 
Short term 
(-1, +1) 
Medium 
short term 
(-2, +2) 
Medium 
long term 
(-3, +3) 
Long term 
(-5, +5) 
Constant 
-5.3906*** 
(-3.1667) 
-2.4373*** 
(-3.0792) 
-2.8440*** 
(-4.8278) 
-2.0251*** 
(-4.8560) 
-10.7659*** 
(-3.7527) 
-4.9483*** 
(-3.6565) 
-2.9842*** 
(-2.8402) 
-2.1564*** 
(-2.8872) 
-35.8178*** 
(-2.9337) 
-19.3733*** 
(-3.3074) 
-29.9202*** 
(-6.5574) 
-21.9471*** 
(-6.6841) 
Turnover t 
0.3327** 
(2.0101) 
0.1554** 
(2.0160) 
0.2746*** 
(4.8723) 
0.1959*** 
(4.9065) 
0.3613** 
(2.1712) 
0.1714** 
(2.2118) 
0.2774*** 
(4.8163) 
0.1988*** 
(4.8611) 
0.6335*** 
(3.7948) 
0.2848*** 
(3.6155) 
0.3010*** 
(4.8549) 
0.2142*** 
(4.8863) 
Liability/TA t 
1.0478* 
(1.8637) 
0.4849* 
(1.8286) 
-0.0147 
(-0.0730) 
-0.0208 
(-0.1440) 
1.1441** 
(2.0443) 
0.5299** 
(2.0074) 
-0.0091 
(-0.0447) 
-0.0158 
(-0.1084) 
0.8389 
(1.6252) 
0.3758 
(1.5213) 
0.0026 
(0.0134) 
-0.0073 
(-0.0513) 
CAPEX/TA t 
0.0118 
(0.0323) 
0.0180 
(0.1035) 
0.0686 
(0.5125) 
0.0767 
(0.7964) 
0.0971 
(0.2651) 
0.0604 
(0.3479) 
0.0732 
(0.5408) 
0.0811 
(0.8328) 
0.1684 
(0.5154) 
0.0887 
(0.5644) 
0.0729 
(0.5692) 
0.0806 
(0.8752) 
ROA t 
15.6874*** 
(14.9779) 
6.9610*** 
(14.3974) 
0.1597** 
(1.9847) 
0.1160** 
(2.0038) 
16.4493*** 
(15.5045) 
7.3183*** 
(14.9258) 
0.1608** 
(1.9836) 
0.1173** 
(2.0112) 
19.0422*** 
(17.4888) 
8.3505*** 
(16.4221) 
0.1328* 
(1.7231) 
0.0968* 
(1.7471) 
Taxation/TA t 
-22.8935*** 
(-4.8465) 
-11.6211*** 
(-5.2760) 
0.5828 
(0.3798) 
0.4701 
(0.4358) 
-24.9323*** 
(-5.2625) 
-12.5895*** 
(-5.6951) 
0.5964 
(0.3839) 
0.4867 
(0.4456) 
-33.5581*** 
(-7.4729) 
-16.4206*** 
(-7.6883) 
0.4318 
(0.2874) 
0.3752 
(0.3555) 
Total Debt/Equity t 
0.0003 
(0.0838) 
0.0003 
(0.1532) 
-0.0004 
(-0.2640) 
-0.0002 
(-0.1954) 
0.0004 
(0.1001) 
0.0002 
(0.1389) 
-0.0005 
(-0.3305) 
-0.0003 
(-0.2669) 
-0.0039 
(-0.9155) 
-0.0015 
(-0.7353) 
-0.0016 
(-1.0083) 
-0.0011 
(-0.9328) 
PE&VC     
-0.8925** 
(-2.0156) 
-0.4398** 
(-2.1415) 
-0.0352 
(-0.2259) 
-0.0368 
(-0.3327) 
-1.0356** 
(-2.5892) 
-0.4918*** 
(-2.6114) 
-0.0036 
(-0.0244) 
-0.0142 
(-0.1353) 
Management Buyout      
-0.4463 
(-0.5595) 
-0.1682 
(-0.4456) 
-0.0002 
(-0.0007) 
-0.0054 
(-0.272) 
-0.8165 
(-1.1316) 
-0.3381 
(-0.9750) 
-0.0541 
(-0.1952) 
-0.0449 
(-0.2333) 
Common Law     
5.7596** 
(2.5647) 
2.6401** 
(2.4899) 
0.1162 
(0.1427) 
0.1145 
(0.1956) 
8.6011** 
(1.9767) 
3.9540* 
(1.8868) 
0.3632 
(0.2136) 
0.3357 
(0.2744) 
Bank-Based     
5.4251*** 
(2.6288) 
2.4923** 
(2.5474) 
0.2184 
(0.2894) 
0.1852 
(0.3415) 
9.7339** 
(2.4552) 
4.7222** 
(2.4794) 
3.3429** 
(2.1564) 
2.5209** 
(2.2595) 
Creditor Rights Index         
1.5720 
(1.4248) 
1.0092* 
(1.9084) 
2.5595*** 
(6.3471) 
1.8730*** 
(6.4551) 
Credit Risk Info         
5.2571*** 
(3.8967) 
2.5777*** 
(4.0430) 
2.0528*** 
(4.0147) 
1.5125*** 
(4.1157) 
Private Credit Register 
(% POP.) 
        
-0.2813*** 
(-5.1382) 
-0.1348*** 
(-5.1521) 
-0.0971*** 
(-4.5783) 
-0.0711*** 
(-4.6608) 
Public Credit Register 
(% POP.) 
        
-0.6848*** 
(-7.4456) 
-0.2988*** 
(-6.8724) 
-0.0454 
(-1.3683) 
-0.0326 
(-1.3675) 
N. Obs. 408 395 381 363 408 395 381 363 408 395 381 363 
Adj. R-squared 0.4191 0.3888 0.0586 0.0585 0.4315 0.4011 0.0494 0.0498 0.5530 0.5142 0.1582 0.1582 
Note: The table reports the results obtained with OLS regression for the different periods considered. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Adj.-R2 is 
adjusted R-squared. 
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Table 4. Cash flow variation 
 
 
Baseline model 
Baseline    +     Transaction 
    model              characteristics 
Baseline    +     Transaction    +    Country 
model             characteristics       effects 
Short term 
(-1, +1) 
Medium 
short term 
(-2, +2) 
Medium 
long term 
(-3, +3) 
Long term 
(-5, +5) 
Short term 
(-1, +1) 
Medium 
short term 
(-2, +2) 
Medium 
long term 
(-3, +3) 
Long term 
(-5, +5) 
Short term 
(-1, +1) 
Medium 
short term 
(-2, +2) 
Medium 
long term 
(-3, +3) 
Long term 
(-5, +5) 
Constant 
0.0093 
(0.1822) 
-0.0630 
(-1.3545) 
-0.0536 
(-1.1824) 
-0.0593 
(-1.3188) 
-0.0260 
(-0.3330) 
-0.1203* 
(-1.6984) 
-0.0929 
(-1.3322) 
-0.0752 
(-1.1047) 
0.0729 
(0.5448) 
-0.0857 
(-0.7227) 
-0.0836 
(-0.7147) 
-0.0705 
(-0.6277) 
Turnover t 
-0.0050 
(-0.9370) 
0.0016 
(0.3309) 
0.0004 
(0.0890) 
0.0005 
(0.1090) 
-0.0080 
(-1.4509) 
-0.0016 
(-0.3217) 
-0.0022 
(-0.4593) 
-0.0018 
(-0.3780) 
-0.0073 
(-1.2322) 
-0.0018 
(-0.3334) 
-0.0030 
(-0.5657) 
-0.0025 
(-0.4835) 
Liability/TA t 
0.0260** 
(2.4221) 
0.0403*** 
(4.0619) 
0.0440*** 
(4.4965) 
0.0477*** 
(4.8979) 
0.0263** 
(2.4522) 
0.0407*** 
(4.1140) 
0.0445*** 
(4.5470) 
0.0481*** 
(4.9295) 
0.0270** 
(2.4858) 
0.0414*** 
(4.1341) 
0.0452*** 
(4.5692) 
0.0489*** 
(4.9576) 
CAPEX/TA t 
-0.0205 
(-1.2867) 
-0.0205 
(-1.3897) 
-0.0200 
(-1.3759) 
-0.0198 
(-1.3651) 
-0.0215 
(-1.3428) 
-0.0217 
(-1.4711) 
-0.0203 
(-1.3910) 
-0.0201 
(-1.3804) 
-0.0219 
(-1.3579) 
-0.0223 
(-1.5055) 
-0.0210 
(-1.4299) 
-0.0208 
(-1.4177) 
ROA t 
-0.0290*** 
(-3.0525) 
-0.0307*** 
(-3.4894) 
-0.0232*** 
(-2.6730) 
-0.0181** 
(-2.0893) 
-0.0292*** 
(-3.0667) 
-0.0311*** 
(-3.5407) 
-0.0232*** 
(-2.6695) 
-0.0180** 
(-2.0823) 
-0.0294*** 
(-3.0699) 
-0.0312*** 
(-3.5259) 
-0.0232*** 
(-2.6536) 
-0.0181** 
(-2.0766) 
Taxation/TA t 
-0.2227* 
(-1.9408) 
-0.1876* 
(-1.7718) 
-0.1534 
(-1.4714) 
-0.1768* 
(-1.7022) 
-0.2445** 
(-2.1148) 
-0.2188** 
(-2.0596) 
-0.1723 
(-1.6403) 
-0.1895** 
(-1.8088) 
-0.2388** 
(-2.0360) 
-0.2123** 
(-1.9698) 
-0.1651 
(-1.5504) 
-0.1809* 
(-1.7025) 
Total Debt/Equity t 
4.53E-05 
(0.2423) 
4.81E-05 
(0.2797) 
6.64E-05 
(0.3925) 
8.39E-05 
(0.4979) 
2.64E-05 
(0.1407) 
4.24E-05 
(0.2466) 
5.17E-05 
(0.3041) 
6.64E-05 
(0.3921) 
-9.09E-06 
(-0.0460) 
3.36E-05 
(1.1864) 
5.76E-05 
(0.3231) 
6.98E-05 
(0.3923) 
PE&VC     
0.0260 
(1.5473) 
0.0331** 
(2.1986) 
0.0205 
(1.3850) 
0.0165 
(1.1262) 
0.0259 
(1.5170) 
0.0332** 
(2.1754) 
0.0210 
(1.4044) 
0.0172 
(1.1572) 
Management Buyout      
0.0474* 
(1.6793) 
0.0595** 
(2.3128) 
0.0476* 
(1.8879) 
0.0396 
(1.5752) 
0.0490* 
(1.7042) 
0.0607** 
(2.3136) 
0.0495* 
(1.9288) 
0.0421 
(1.6437) 
Common Law     
0.0059 
(0.1046) 
0.0169 
(0.3424) 
0.0091 
(1.1864) 
-0.0085 
(-0.1811) 
0.0353 
(0.3553) 
0.0731 
(0.8005) 
0.0707 
(0.7822) 
0.0413 
(0.4598) 
Bank-Based     
0.0386 
(0.6991) 
0.0417 
(0.8516) 
0.0373 
(0.7697) 
0.0206 
(0.4414) 
0.0323 
(0.4351) 
0.0636 
(0.9484) 
0.0691 
(1.0410) 
0.0490 
(0.7531) 
Creditor Rights Index         
-0.0038 
(-0.2838) 
-0.0063 
(-0.5103) 
-0.0077 
(-0.6322) 
-0.0059 
(-0.4923) 
Credit Risk Info         
-0.0165 
(-0.6716) 
0.0039 
(0.1729) 
0.0124 
(0.5585) 
0.0095 
(0.4307) 
Private Credit Register 
(% POP.) 
        
-4.26E-05 
(-0.4409) 
-0.0006 
(-0.7172) 
-0.0008 
(-0.9076) 
-0.0006 
(-0.6968) 
Public Credit Register 
(% POP.) 
        
0.0004 
(0.1463) 
-0.0005 
(-0.2111) 
-0.0009 
(-0.3857) 
-0.0008 
(-0.3812) 
N. Obs. 538 533 524 495 538 533 524 495 538 533 524 495 
Adj. R-squared 0.3600 0.3904 0.2612 0.1535 0.3668 0.4055 0.3528 0.2450 0.4430 0.4988 0.2666 0.1615 
Note: The table reports the results obtained with OLS regression for the different periods considered. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Adj.-R2 is 
adjusted R-squared. 
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In fact, the second and the third model of the 
analysis show that in the short/medium term the 
presence of such operators tends to generate an 
accumulation of cash for PE&VC backed firms. In 
this sense, then there is a little evidence (the 
significance level is 10%) of the fact that the actions 
of management buyouts also push in this direction, 
allowing, especially in the short and medium-term, 
to increase cash flow. In fact, the intercept is shown 
as a positive and statistically significant in the short 
and medium-term, both for the second and for the 
third model, while in the long term is not significant. 
Therefore, there is evidence that the companies 
subject to an MBO tend to experience an 
accumulation of cash, but only in the short and 
medium-term. We can interpret this result by saying 
that the MBO does not produce any permanent 
effect, so that, in agreement with the view taken by 
Mehran and Peristiani (2010), one can only partially 
support the free cash flow hypothesis. The ROA 
instead highlights, for all models and all-time 
horizons, that the most profitable subsequently 
experience a marked decrease in cash & cash 
equivalent. The result is shown as particularly 
significant since the coefficients are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Nevertheless, 
the result is highly unexpected, since it is not easy to 
understand how the most profitable can then 
experience a reduction of their cash on hand. This 
phenomenon, however, may be seen from another 
point of view. In reality, the availability of cash may 
be considered either as the generation of cash flow 
or in terms of retention of cash (cash accumulation). 
In this case, the most profitable are those that are 
more efficient and thus might be in a possibility to 
drain liquidity, a situation that seems to have been 
less strong in those imprinted with a heavy debt, 
which as we have seen, is able to mitigate this 
phenomenon. Finally, looking at the relationship 
Taxation/TA, it is possible to notice that the 
coefficients are negative and statistically significant 
in all models, especially in the short and long term, 
reflecting the fact that the companies subject to 
greater tax burden have also drained liquidity excess 
creating a “cash spooling”. This led them to 
rationalize the availability of cash & cash 
equivalents, allowing them to increase their level of 
efficiency. 
 
5.4. Operating performance hypothesis 
 
With regard to the economic/financial performance 
of the deal, US literature on LBO and especially 
Kaplan (1989), Singh (1990), Smart and Waldfogel 
(1994) tend to highlight, for companies that have 
been subject to LBO, an improvement in operating 
performance in the post-buyout. However, these 
studies were carried out during the first wave of 
LBOs, which occurred in 1980 at a time when it was 
particularly easy to find companies that were 
undervalued. This, of course, made it even more 
likely that he could be an improvement in operating 
performance in the post-buyout. In fact, the analysis 
carried out by Guo et al. (2011) on the second wave 
of LBO can not show any improvement in industry 
adjusted performance after the buyout. There is 
then further research, carried out by Long and 
Ravenscraft (1993), Guo et al. (2011), Weir et al. 
(2009) that put instead emphasize improvements in 
adjusted performance post-LBO, especially in the 
short and medium-term. The results obtained among 
that issue are presented in Table 5.  
The analysis aims to identify what are the 
factors that affect the operating performance of 
firms, which in this case is represented by the 
dependent variable Variation of Turnover. The 
evidence shows that economic performance is 
positively affected by taxes, the profitability original 
starting business (long-term), the creation of a 
management buyout from the fact that the country 
has a legal system of type “common law” and the 
fact that the financial system is of type “bank-
based”, while it is negatively influenced by the debt 
from the original departure profitability of 
enterprise (short-term), the index of the depth of 
credit information and the degree of coverage of 
public records on credit. Especially the latter two, 
are used as control variables, in order to avoid the 
main criticism that is moved to these models, 
namely that suffer from an error distortion arising 
from omitted variables. Looking at the relationship 
Liability/TA, it is possible to notice that in all models 
and time horizons of reference, there is significant 
evidence (at the 1% level) that the most indebted 
companies then experience a decrease in their 
performance. The ROA provides evidence very 
interesting highlights how companies that at the 
time “t” had a high level of profitability then tend to 
begin to experience a significant reduction in the 
short term (at the level of 1%) of their profitability 
and then show a substantial increase in the long 
term (at 1%) and thus a return to profitability. This 
recovery occurs in all three models in the long run 
as if it was necessary for businesses time to recover 
their profitability. This is because the operation 
lever beginning stifles operations (and profitability) 
and only in the long term allows companies to 
recover their stability. The increase in profitability 
occurs especially if the operation is a buyout, in 
accordance therefore with the theories of Long and 
Ravenscraft (1993), Guo et al. (2009), Weir et al. 
(2009), if the company is operating in a common law 
country and if the financial system is bank-based. 
Indeed, the coefficients for these variables are 
positive and statistically significant, thus attesting to 
the existence of a positive relationship of the 
variables with the profitability of the undertaking. 
But we must consider that there are also control 
variables which act negatively as the index of depth 
of credit information, rather than the degree of 
coverage of the public registers on credit: in this 
case the coefficients are negative and statistically 
significant, thus attesting to the existence of a 
negative relationship of the variables with 
profitability. From this perspective, the evidence 
shows that firms operating in a macroeconomic 
environment of high index of depth of credit 
information and a high degree of coverage of public 
records on credit have seen, in the medium and long 
term, contract their profitability. 
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Table 5. Turnover variation 
 
 
Baseline model 
Baseline    +     Transaction 
     model              characteristics 
Baseline    +     Transaction    +    Country 
model              characteristics       effects 
Short term 
(-1, +1) 
Medium 
short term 
(-2, +2) 
Medium 
long term 
(-3, +3) 
Long term 
(-5, +5) 
Short term 
(-1, +1) 
Medium 
short term 
(-2, +2) 
Medium 
long term 
(-3, +3) 
Long term 
(-5, +5) 
Short term 
(-1, +1) 
Medium 
short term 
(-2, +2) 
Medium 
long term 
(-3, +3) 
Long term 
(-5, +5) 
Constant 
-0.2939 
(-1.3363) 
-0.6478** 
(-2.5151) 
-0.6516** 
(-2.4295) 
-0.8199*** 
(-3.0049) 
-0.6467** 
(-2.0539) 
-0.8017** 
(-2.1848) 
-0.7045* 
(-1.8483) 
-0.7432** 
(-1.9655) 
-0.6560 
(-1.4244) 
-0.5702 
(-1.0721) 
-0.5059 
(-0.9082) 
-0.1823 
(-0.3346) 
Turnover t 
0.0306 
(1.4499) 
0.0647*** 
(2.6059) 
0.0678*** 
(2.6453) 
0.0846*** 
(3.2334) 
0.0228 
(1.0779) 
0.0566** 
(2.2525) 
0.0557** 
(2.1529) 
0.0688*** 
(2.6165) 
0.0447* 
(1.9532) 
0.0825*** 
(3.0423) 
0.0767*** 
(2.7406) 
0.0903*** 
(3.2010) 
Liability/TA t 
-0.1113 
(-1.4384) 
-0.0313 
(-0.3392) 
-0.0164 
(-0.1717) 
0.0026 
(0.0272) 
-0.1191 
(-1.5444) 
-0.0426 
(-0.4605) 
-0.0267 
(-0.2795) 
-0.0158 
(-0.1621) 
-0.0929 
(-1.1838) 
-0.0040 
(-0.0428) 
0.0213 
(0.2173) 
0.0495 
(0.4971) 
CAPEX/TA t 
0.0345 
(0.6337) 
0.0394 
(0.6017) 
0.0388 
(0.5638) 
0.0190 
(0.2667) 
0.0264 
(0.4843) 
0.0284 
(0.4330) 
0.0217 
(0.3146) 
-0.0036 
(-0.0513) 
0.0312 
(0.5777) 
0.0320 
(0.4886) 
0.0246 
(0.3583) 
-0.0035 
(-0.0509) 
ROA t 
-0.2301* 
(-1.6817) 
0.1934 
(1.2050) 
0.2051*** 
(4.9730) 
0.1573*** 
(3.6862) 
-0.2683* 
(-1.9360) 
0.1362 
(0.8340) 
0.1968*** 
(4.7813) 
0.1464*** 
(3.4624) 
-0.3469** 
(-2.4262) 
0.0732 
(0.4343) 
0.1901*** 
(4.6265) 
0.1371*** 
(3.2674) 
Taxation/TA t 
4.3717*** 
(8.9997) 
3.2309*** 
(5.5630) 
3.2524*** 
(5.8312) 
3.2812*** 
(5.7493) 
4.3099*** 
(8.8908) 
3.2097*** 
(8.8908) 
3.1342*** 
(5.6115) 
3.1159*** 
(5.4874) 
4.5160*** 
(9.0937) 
3.4114*** 
(5.7023) 
3.2789*** 
(5.8065) 
3.3230*** 
(5.8218) 
Total debt/Equity t 
-0.0036*** 
(-5.5762) 
-0.0056*** 
(-7.2369) 
-0.0079*** 
(-9.7398) 
-0.0078*** 
(-9.3138) 
-0.0036*** 
(-5.5800) 
-0.0055*** 
(-5.5800) 
-0.0078*** 
(-9.6012) 
-0.0077*** 
(-9.2471) 
-0.0042*** 
(-6.1837) 
-0.0063*** 
(-7.7102) 
-0.0085*** 
(-9.8930) 
-0.0085*** 
(-9.7207) 
PE&VC     
0.1429** 
(2.3189) 
0.1572** 
(2.3189) 
0.2139*** 
(2.8665) 
0.2689*** 
(3.5472) 
0.1249** 
(2.0310) 
0.1384* 
(1.8982) 
0.1895** 
(2.5334) 
0.2445*** 
(3.2342) 
Management buyout      
0.1182 
(1.0609) 
0.0795 
(1.0609) 
0.0573 
(0.4187) 
0.2077 
(1.5174) 
0.0872 
(0.7775) 
0.0593 
(0.4373) 
0.0278 
(0.2011) 
0.1936 
(1.4099) 
Common law     
0.2601 
(1.3123) 
0.1058 
(1.3123) 
0.0373 
(0.1558) 
-0.2100 
(-0.8924) 
0.3899 
(1.0782) 
0.2845 
(0.6532) 
0.2754 
(0.6019) 
0.1908 
(0.4103) 
Bank based     
0.3338* 
(1.7109) 
0.1292* 
(1.7109) 
0.0608 
(0.2565) 
-0.1804 
(-0.7691) 
0.4281 
(1.5765) 
0.1774 
(0.5516) 
0.1654 
(0.4894) 
-0.0578 
(-0.1705) 
Creditor rights index         
0.0731 
(1.5852) 
0.0688 
(1.2400) 
0.0557 
(0.9568) 
0.0332 
(0.5618) 
Credit risk info         
-0.1827** 
(-2.1953) 
-0.2019** 
(-2.0074) 
-0.1780* 
(-1.6882) 
-0.2407** 
(-2.2414) 
Private credit register 
(% POP.) 
        
0.0014 
(0.4283) 
-0.0007 
(-0.1917) 
-0.0008 
(-0.1935) 
-0.0005 
(-0.1356) 
Public credit register 
(% POP.) 
        
0.0032 
(0.3742) 
-0.0037 
(-0.3592) 
-0.0021 
(-0.2032) 
0.0006 
(0.0598) 
N. Obs. 474 460 450 427 474 460 450 427 474 460 450 427 
Adj. R-squared 0.2254 0.1923 0.2704 0.2395 0.2345 0.1944 0.2774 0.2575 0.2485 0.2048 0.2835 0.2695 
Note: The table reports the results obtained with OLS regression for the different periods considered. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Adj.-R2 is 
adjusted R-squared. 
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Finally, looking at the relationship Taxation/TA, 
you may notice that the coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant (at the 1% level) in all models, 
but only in the short term, reflecting the fact that 
the companies subject to greater tax burden in the 
short term have also experienced an increase in their 
profitability. This probably occurs due to the 
deductibility of interest expense arising from the 
debt: in fact companies with higher taxes, are the 
ones that then, to try to reduce taxes, they often 
decide to adopt a strategy to expand their level of 
debt, so then you can make the effect of 
deductibility of interest expense related to it. This, 
of course, leads to the reduction of the tax burden in 
the short term, together with an increase in the 
profitability of these companies. 
 
5.5. Distressed hypothesis 
 
As already mentioned, regardless of the role played 
in these transactions, private equity firms have been 
often accused of asset stripping and their reselling 
after leveraged buy-outs. Moreover, private equity 
firms have been criticized for achieving 
restructuring within firms that negatively impacts 
employment levels, employee remuneration and 
other human resource management practices 
(Wright et al., 2009). Noteworthy, despite the 
increased of defaulted LBOs, there has been still 
little emphasis in the academic literature on the 
potential downside of PE-backed LBOs (Kaplan & 
Stein, 1993; Andrade & Kaplan, 1998; Hotchkiss, 
Strömberg, & Smith, 2011). In order to address the 
risk of distressed, we created the variable Distressed, 
which represents a dummy variable, which assumes 
value 1 if the company after the deal experiments a 
conjunct reduction of Total Assets, Number of 
Employees and Turnover, and 0 otherwise. The 
question now is whether the presence of a PE 
favours this process or not, because their aim is to 
strip assets from businesses and hence reduce 
employment (Jelic & Wright, 2010). To investigate 
this issue, we run a regression of the binary dummy 
variable Distressed within the different versions of 
the model we utilized above. If the presence of PE 
increases the probability of an event of distress, we 
expect a positive coefficient. 
 
 
Table 6. Distressed dummy 
 
 
Baseline model 
Baseline model + Transaction 
characteristics 
Baseline model + Transaction 
characteristics + Country effects 
Constant 
-2.7258*** 
(-3.0757) 
-2.5437* 
(-1.8095) 
-2.0380 
(-0.9979) 
LN Total Assets 
0.1765** 
(2.1316) 
0.1179 
(1.3573) 
0.1086 
(1.1418) 
Liability (Debt)/TA 
0.5748 
(1.4262) 
0.3310 
(0.8835) 
0.3196 
(0.8506) 
CAPEX/TA 
0.0625 
(0.3448) 
-0.0246 
(-0.1347) 
-0.0242 
(-0.1321) 
ROA 
3.3864*** 
(3.7390) 
2.2864*** 
(2.6519) 
2.2126** 
(2.4107) 
Taxation/TA 
0.4208 
(0.1473) 
1.6067 
(0.5871) 
1.7897 
(0.6351) 
Total Debt/Equity 
-0.0019 
(-0.7101) 
-0.0011 
(-0.4053) 
0.0002 
(0.0579) 
PE&VC  
0.9390*** 
(4.2698) 
0.9031*** 
(3.9963) 
Management Buyout   
0.3893 
(0.9761) 
0.4182 
(1.0364) 
Common Law  
-0.0653 
(-0.0656) 
2.5344 
(0.9853) 
Bank-Based  
-0.4976 
(-0.4868) 
0.7454 
(0.3690) 
Creditor Rights Index   
-0.4416* 
(-1.7588) 
Credit Risk Info   
0.1917 
(0.4256) 
Private Credit Register 
(% POP.) 
  
-0.0020 
(-0.1282) 
Public Credit Register 
(% POP.) 
  
0.0904 
(1.4531) 
N. Obs. 409 409 406 
Log-likelihood -275.0642 -264.4265 -259.8510 
Note: The table reports the results obtained with the binary Logit model for the long term perspective (-5, +5). *, **, and *** 
indicate Z-statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 6 shows that the participation of a PE 
firm in an LBO deal has an impact on total assets 
contraction, the number of employees reduction, as 
well as turnover contraction. We interpret this 
finding with the agency cost reduction achieved by 
the management role played by PE investors (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976; Kaplan, 1989b; Easterwood & Seth, 
1993; Coakley, Hadass, & Wood, 2009; Weir et al., 
2009). In other words, we find evidence that in 
certain case the presence of PE investors can become 
potential detrimental for firms, probably because 
their pressure to achieve their financial performance 
push them to bear a high level of risk, with the 
consequence of a higher likelihood of distress. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The objective of this study has been to analyze the 
objectives of LBO transactions, together with the 
risks and opportunities that can derive to the whole 
firms’ stakeholders. From this perspective, we add to 
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previous literature that has investigated the post-
LBO operating performance and the factors that can 
determine the success of those deals. In particular, 
we confirm the hypothesis of assets stripping, even 
if we find evidence that the presence of private 
equity, among other factors, can help to mitigate 
that peril. We find evidence that especially firms 
characterized by a higher debt before the deal, are 
more suitable to experiment a contraction of the 
number of employees, even if also for this variable 
we find evidence that the presence of private equity 
mitigates that threat. We find evidence of a 
contraction of the cost of employees, which seems 
to become even stronger when the firm is 
characterized by a higher level of taxation and when 
a private equity investor is involved. We find 
evidence that, especially in the short term, 
enterprises suffer from a slight deterioration in 
operating performance compared to their situation 
before the buyout. Moreover, under specific 
circumstances, enterprises experience a slight 
improvement in the ability to generate cash. Finally, 
we find evidence that the presence of private equity 
investors is mainly able to promote the growth of 
firms, as well as to increase the capability to 
generate cash. To perform this analysis, we created a 
dataset that was sufficiently large and able to carry 
out a survey of these types of operations, with a 
final sample consisting of 2,450 MBO and MBI deals, 
which we consider as particularly significant since it 
is related to a very broad sample of transactions 
occurred around the world. This study adds to 
previous literature that has investigated the post-
LBO operating performance and the factors that 
determine their success, as well as their failure. In 
particular, based on regressions performed on the 
sample, our analysis shows that, overall, the 
undertakings under an LBO transaction experience 
in the short term, a slight deterioration in operating 
performance compared to their situation before the 
buyout. The benefits most relevant and significant in 
operational performance occur in the medium and 
long term. This is mainly because in the short term, 
the operation lever tends to stifle the operations and 
profitability. In addition, companies that make a 
buyout, also seem to experience a slight 
improvement in the ability to generate cash. Instead, 
the presence of a private equity operator does not 
show significantly influence the performance of the 
post-LBO companies. The presence of these 
operators is mainly able to promote the growth of 
firms in the medium and long term, whilst in the 
medium-term they increase the availability of cash 
and cash equivalents, as well as help, increase the 
workforce in them, thus leading to greater use of 
employees. The original size of the business proves 
to be an important issue, but only with regard to the 
possibility of a further increase in size: there is 
evidence that larger companies, once the buyout 
occurs, grow faster than the others. Debt rather 
appears as a factor that can influence different 
aspects. First, the most indebted companies, after 
the buyout experience a minor increase in size. At 
the same time, however, those firms appear to 
generate an accumulation of cash, as a decrease in 
their efficiency. The high level of debt pushes them 
to contract the number of employees. Of course, 
higher debt also means lower operating profitability 
and an increase in short-term borrowing costs, but 
we must not forget the positive impact that the 
higher debt has in terms of ability to reduce taxes, 
especially in the medium/long term. The 
profitability of companies is an independent variable 
that appears to influence many aspects. First, 
companies more profitable after the buyout seem to 
experience a greater increase in size than the others. 
At the same time, they demonstrate an ability to 
reduce cash & cash equivalent, by increasing their 
level of efficiency. This is because the most 
profitable companies are those that are more 
efficient and thus might be in a possibility to drain 
liquidity. At the same time, the most profitable 
companies lead to an increase in the number of 
employees. There is also evidence that more 
profitable firms after the buyout tend to experience, 
in the short and medium-term, an increase in 
financial expenses and a reduction of the tax 
burden. In fact, usually the most profitable 
companies are those we experience a greater tax 
burden, so that try to reduce taxes, by expanding 
their level of debt. This of course in the short and 
medium-term leads to an increase in financial 
expense and a reduction of taxes. Finally, also the 
taxes appear to be an independent variable capable 
of influencing different aspects. First, firms with 
higher tax charges, once completed the buyout show 
experience as well as a minor increase in size than 
the other, also a significant contraction of the chest, 
revealing, therefore, an increased level of efficiency. 
At the same time, however, those firms show a 
significant increase in the number of employees, 
especially in the medium and long term. This can be 
explained mainly in light of the tax breaks that 
benefit companies that increase their workforce. 
There is also evidence that firms with a higher tax 
burden, after the buyout experienced in the short 
term a significant increase in profitability and a 
sharp decline in financial expenses. Finally, the 
evidence of our analysis shows that firms that had 
higher tax burden, after the buyout tend to 
experience in the short term, a further increase in 
the tax burden and experienced in the medium and 
long term, a significant decrease in taxes. This is 
because companies who try to reduce their tax 
burden in the medium/long term through the 
continued expansion of their level of debt, then take 
advantage of the effect of deductibility of interest 
expense. In conclusion, we consider this work of a 
particular relevance in order to contribute to the 
understanding of the potential effects of LBOs 
transactions upon firms involved in those deals, 
although we consider that further investigation is 
necessary in order to better understand the role 
played by PE operators in such transactions, 
especially when considering the conditions of 
financial distress experienced during such 
transactions. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A. Correlation matrix 
 
 
Total Assets 
(var) 
Cash/TA 
(var) 
Employees 
(var) 
EBITDA/ 
Turnover (var) 
Fin.Expense/ 
Turnover 
(var) 
Tax/ 
Turnover 
(var) 
Total Assets 
Liability 
(Debt)/TA 
CAPEX/TA ROA Taxation /TA 
Total Debt/ 
Equity 
Total Assets (var) 1.000            
Cash/TA(var) - 0.067 1.000           
Employees (var) 0.166 0.015 1.000          
EBITDA/Turnover (var) 0.097 0.243 -0.260 1.000         
Fin.Expense/ 
Turnover (var) 
0.021 - 0.174 0.441 - 0.713 1.000        
Tax/Turnover (var) 0.108 0.089 0.263 0.154 - 0.027 1.000       
Total Assets  0.029 - 0.098 - 0.090 - 0.082 0.019 - 0.062 1.000      
Liability (Debt)/TA 0.025 0.150 - 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.001 - 0.100 1.000     
CAPEX/TA 0.064 - 0.165 0.033 - 0.045 0.009 - 0.006 - 0.029 - 0.094 1.000    
ROA 0.098 - 0.166 0.310 - 0.576 0.531 0.076 0.100 - 0.125 0.030 1.000   
Taxation /TA 0.058 - 0.016 0.184 - 0.009 0.047 0.051 - 0.024 - 0.027 0.001 0.325 1.000  
Total Debt /Equity 0.117 - 0.008 - 0.501 - 0.028 0.006 0.020 0.073 0.069 - 0.013 - 0.027 -0.066 1.000 
 
